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SOME INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY CASES
JAmmEs H. WILKINSON*
This seminar is evidence of the tremendous interest in products
liability cases throughout the United States. The consideration given
to this field by the publishing houses and writers in the last few years
has both stimulated and given recognition to this phase of litigation.
I have some concern over the classification "Products Liability Cases."
Basically, the cases we are talking about are either personal injury
or property damage cases involving the use of or the exposure to some-
thing which has been manufactured, concocted, assembled, processed
or distributed by someone.
There has been comparatively little case law in Ohio on this sub-
ject, but I will here attempt to give a review of some Ohio cases to
illustrate the development of products liability law in Ohio, with more
specific reference to one case, Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.'
I will try to present the basic theories upon which products lia-
bility cases are brought. In reviewing the Ohio cases, I am not so much
impressed with any new theory of law as I am with the attempts by
courts and lawyers to apply existing principles of law which we use in
everyday tort work to new fact situations. I am suspicious that those
lawyers who first began to pursue those drivers of horseless carriages
who ran down chickens, cows and sundry farmers felt the same way
we do now when they went to the case law and to the statutes, trying
to find the proper remedy against what they considered to be a new
species of tortfeasors.
The claims which come into our offices are basically claims for
personal injury or property damage or both. In Ohio the theory of re-
covery is still tied to the concept of fault on the part of the person from
whom damages are sought. Some writers and some speakers have
sought to eliminate the requirement of fault on the general theory that
this is a social problem involving a situation where the mass of con-
sumers must be compensated for loss or injury by the producer or the
seller of products who, by itself or with the help of insurance, is better
able to sustain the expense of loss or injury due to the consumption
of goods or products than is the individual from that mass who has
spent all his money on something else. As will be seen from the Ohio
cases at least, even where our courts have allowed recovery in warranty,
the element of fault is still present. Even in warranty one must prove
* Of the firm of Arter, Hadden, Wykoff and Van Duzer, Cleveland, Ohio.
1 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
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that there was something wrong with the product or that there was a
deleterious substance in the product.
OHIO CASES
Two of the earliest Ohio cases involving products liability are
White Sewing Machine Co. v. Feisel2 and Ward Baking Co. v. Triz-
zino.' For some reason, the earlier case was reported later so that the
appellate court in the Ward case, without knowledge of the White
case, felt that it was all alone in the State of Ohio when it considered
the problem of liability of a remote seller or manufacturer.
These two cases are very interesting and show ingenuity, imagi-
nation, preparation and hard work resulting in a favorable result from
the plaintiff's point of view. The Ward case involved a cake purchased
by plaintiff from a retailer, the eating of that cake by the plaintiff, and
the injuries caused to plaintiff when he swallowed a needle which had
been embedded in the cake. The cake had been sold by defendant who
had packaged it in wrapping paper, boxed it and delivered it to the
retailer who, as a mere conduit in the line of distribution, sold it to the
purchaser. Plaintiff had competent medical testimony, fortified with
X-rays, following the needle all the way through plaintiff's digestive
tract, and properly, medically documented his case on causation. In
considering the theories claimed by plaintiff supporting liability sound-
ing in either warranty or tort, the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga
County was troubled with the problem of privity, but decided that
plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary of a contract between manu-
facturer and his vendee, the retailer, and therefore plaintiff was the
beneficiary of an implied warranty on the part of defendant as to
wholesomeness and freedom from foreign substances.
The theory of this case has not been followed in Ohio in subse-
quent case law. The case has been cited far and wide in support of the
third-party beneficiary theory. It is interesting to note, however, that
the third-party beneficiary principle shows up again in Ohio as of
July 1, 1962, the effective date of our Uniform Commercial Code.
White Sewing Machine Co. v. Feisel4 is a negligence case, again
well prepared by an imaginative and effective attorney. This case in-
volved a child injured by a defective electric sewing machine cord or
plug. Plaintiff's mother had purchased the sewing machine involved
from defendant. The child was severely burned about the mouth when
she stuck one end of the cord into her mouth while the other end was
plugged into an electric outlet. Counsel was careful to show that plain-
2 28 Ohio App. 152, 162 N.E. 633 (1927).
3 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
4 Supra note 2.
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tiff's mother had left the cord plugged into the wall but detached from
the sewing machine just as defendant's agent had done when he demon-
strated the machine upon delivery. After the child had been taken to
the doctor, the cord was taken to the lawyer's office and carefully kept
in the safe until trial. There is no doubt that upon trial this cord was
defective. Here the court of appeals upheld the judgment for plaintiff,
applying the rule of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Car Co.5 This our
court did reluctantly, stating that it was the general rule that there
was no liability even in tort in the absence of privity between the
parties. On the basis of public policy and on the general principle
that the end justifies the means, the court stated: "Danger to mem-
bers of the family from a defective appliance of this character is one
to be foreseen by the manufacturer who sells it to one of the members
of the family."'
I selected these two early cases because, as indicated above, they
reflect theory now adopted by our Uniform Commercial Code, apply-
ing the idea of third-party beneficiary and restriction of foreseeability
to members of the family and household.
There is no intent here to give all cases in Ohio involving products
liability problems. For purposes of illustration, I have selected five
cases involving the Honorable Lee J. Skeel, now judge of the Court
of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, Ohio. I intend this as a tribute to
Judge Skeel's interest in and effect upon products liability cases.
The first is Sicard v. Kremer,' where Judge Skeel was the trial
judge. This is a good case to begin with in that the Ohio Supreme
Court opinion has in it statements of legal principles sounding in both
tort and contract and, in addition, it has an interesting fact situation.
This is an excellent case for reference and use in one's brief. Helpful
quotations may be found in this opinion to support plaintiff or de-
fendant in almost any products liability case.
This was an action against a distributor of a product. There was
no privity between plaintiff and defendant. The trial judge, Skeel, dis-
missed the claim presented in warranty and let the case go to the jury
on negligence. The court of appeals reversed the trial court, indicating
that the case should have gone to the jury on warranty, but that there
was nothing to submit to the jury on negligence. The Ohio Supreme
Court's decision is a very useful decision on negligence or warranty.
The case actually seems to have been affirmed for plaintiff by the
Ohio Supreme Court on the evidence, particularly with respect to the
proof that the product contained a very dangerous substance, even a
5 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
6 White Sewing Machine Co. v. Feisel, supra note 2, at 159, 162 N.E. at 640.
7 133 Ohio St. 291, 13 N.E.2d 250 (1938).
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poison. The very dangerous substance was hydrogen peroxide, still
used in many hair dyes and bleaches. A chemist employed by the city
of Cleveland had performed a demonstration in the courtroom using
100-volume hydrogen peroxide. When he put his finger in a glass of
100-volume hydrogen peroxide for a short period of time, his finger
turned white. This should shock no one. This was, however, the evi-
dence of poison or dangerous substance. I cannot overlook this op-
portunity to express my concern over these facts. No one uses 100-
volume hydrogen peroxide undiluted in hair dyes or bleaches. Usually
20-volume hydrogen peroxide is used and only after it has been mixed
with the rest of the product. Further, hydrogen peroxide is a common
antiseptic and is often used as a mouthwash. Finally, the facts as
shown in the opinion indicate that plaintiff was a beauty operator who
was injured while using this dangerous hair dye on the head and hair
of a customer. I have always wondered what happened to the customer.
Judge Skeel wrote the appellate decision in Krupar v. Procter &
Gamble.' The appellate decision is very similar in its approach to war-
ranty and privity to the opinion eventually written by Judge Skeel
on the appellate level in the Rogers9 case. In fact, Krupar, like Rogers,
was certified to the Supreme Court of Ohio on the warranty question
as being in conflict with another Ohio appellate decision. In Krupar,
however, the Ohio Supreme Court decided that warranty was not even
an issue in the case and proceeded to decide the case on pure negli-
gence theory and on the evidence question of res ipsa loquitur. Krupar
is the "wire in the soap" case. The reasoning of the opinion generally
appeals to defendants and is shunned by plaintiffs. Plaintiff used a bar
of soap which had been in use or at least had been in the bathroom for
a week or so prior to the incident when plaintiff was scratched by a
piece of wire embedded in the ,bar of soap. The Ohio Supreme Court
held that the fact that the wire was there and did scratch plaintiff
does not prove negligence on the part of the manufacturer. In the ab-
sence of further evidence plaintiff lost.
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.10 originally gave no signs
of being a "landmark case." It was like others handled by the defense
attorney. Plaintiff had used a permanent wave solution and claimed she
had lost her hair as a result of that use. Plaintiff sued for personal
injuries, setting up what were described as three causes of action: negli-
gence, express warranty and implied warranty. Plaintiff sued not only
the retailer but also the alleged manufacturer, Toni Home Permanent
8 160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954). Judge Skeel's appellate decision is reported
only in 113 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953).
9 105 Ohio App. 53 (1957).
10 Supra notes 1 and 9.
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Co. Counsel for the defense followed a procedure which had been
successful in the handling of similar cases. A demurrer was first filed
on the grounds of misjoinder of parties defendant, relying on Kniess
v. Armour & Co." This case has been good authority for the proposi-
tion that you cannot join those who are primarily and secondarily
liable, specifically a meat packer and the retailer. This demurrer was
sustained and plaintiff had her first decision to make. She elected to
proceed against the manufacturer as most plaintiffs do and have done,
refiling the same petition but only against the alleged defendant-manu-
facturer. Relying on Wood v. General Electric,2 a demurrer was then
filed against the "causes of action" sounding in express and implied
warranty. The trial court sustained the demurrers. This again was not
an unusual result. Plaintiff was then left with only a fraction of her
original petition and only one of her original defendants. Normally
this would have been a good time to discuss an amicable disposition
of the claim. Plaintiff allowed or encouraged the trial court to enter
judgment with respect to the "causes of action" sounding in warranty
and appealed to the court of appeals.
It should be remembered that the appeal taken was on what were
described as two separate causes of action sounding in express war-
ranty and implied warranty. The court of appeals sustained the trial
court with respect to implied warranty and overruled and reversed the
trial court with respect to express warranty. The appellate court in-
dicated that it was bound by Wood, but that since that case was limited
on its facts to implied warranty, the appellate court was free to decide
for itself on the matter of express warranty and did so. Judge Skeel
followed the same path he had pursued in Krupar and certified the
case to the Supreme Court of Ohio as a conflict case. A majority of the
Ohio Supreme Court substantially adopted the reasoning of Judge
Skeel as set forth in his appellate opinion and eliminated the require-
ment of privity in an express warranty action. However, it should be
noted that the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the action
of the appellate court which, in effect, upheld the requirement of privity
in an implied warranty action.
Perhaps at this point it would be helpful to know that when the
Supreme Court of Ohio heard the oral arguments in Rogers, it had al-
ready heard the arguments but had not decided Welsh v. Ledyard.'3
This was an action founded on implied warranty where the question
of the requirement of privity was raised. Two months before the de-
cision was announced in Rogers, the Ohio Supreme Court handed down
11 134 Ohio St. 432, 17 N.E.2d 734 (1938).
12 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N..2d 8 (1953).
13 167 Ohio St. 57, 146 N.E.2d 299 (1957).
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its ruling in Welsh, upholding Wood and requiring privity in an action
based upon implied warranty.
In Rogers there are dicta which could easily be interpreted to give
encouragement to those who sought elimination of privity as a re-
quirement in implied warranty. After Rogers and within the same year,
Judge Skeel wrote an opinion in Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins.4
In his opinion Judge Skeel attempted to eliminate the requirement of
privity in an implied warranty action in a products liability case. It
is the writer's personal opinion that Judge Skeel felt that this case
would be appealed and that the Ohio Supreme Court would follow
the dicta of Rogers and eliminate the requirement of privity in an ac-
tion based upon implied warranty. What Judge Skeel could not foresee
was that this case would not be appealed. He could not foresee the
reason for the lack of appeal. What Judge Skeel could not know was
that the real defendant in Rogers and Markovich was one and the
same. The products were different but the manufacturers were owned
by the same company which controlled the litigation. Though the cases
arose in the same county, counsel for defendant in each case was a
different attorney and none of the names of the parties was identical.
When Markovich was first reported, Rogers was back for trial follow-
ing the action of the Ohio Supreme Court. Counsel representing de-
fendant in the Rogers case strenuously urged national counsel for the
common manufacturer to appeal Markovich because of that decision's
adverse effect on the forthcoming trial of Rogers. Counsel for Toni
Home Permanent Co. was advised that no appeal would be taken for
the reason that national counsel was disenchanted with the Ohio courts.
A lack of confidence in Ohio courts was expressed on the reasoning
that in order to defeat the defendant in Rogers our court had stated
there was a difference between express and implied warranty, but in
order to defeat the defendant in Markovich the same court indicated
that there was no difference between express and implied warranty.
Kennedy v. General Beauty Products"s points up what the writer
feels is technically the case law of Ohio today with respect to implied
warranty and emphasizes the distinction between an action based
upon express warranty and an action based upon implied warranty
insofar as the requirement of privity is concerned.
Kennedy was a hair-dye case with the personal injury action be-
ing brought against the distributor. The element of privity was missing.
The case was sent to a jury on the theory of negligence and express
warranty. Implied warranty was not submitted by the trial judge. The
14 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958).
15 112 Ohio App. 505, 167 N.E.2d 116 (1960).
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judgment for the defendant was appealed on several grounds including
claimed error in the refusal to submit the case to the jury on implied
warranty. Judge Skeel's appellate opinion clearly states, without ap-
proval, that the Ohio law as pronounced by the supreme court dif-
ferentiates between express and implied warranty, requiring the ele-
ment of privity in the latter but not the former.
What the Supreme Court of Ohio will do with this question should
it accept a case which raises the question is anyone's guess.
It can be argued that there is no reason in theory for any distinc-
tion between express and implied warranty to support a difference in
the requirement of privity. This is a legalistic, technical argument. The
elimination of the requirement of privity in Rogers was not, however,
founded upon a technical, legalistic base. The syllabus and the opinion
in that case clearly show the reason for the rule established. The rule
of Rogers is that where a defendant manufacturer affirmatively does
something, usually by way of advertising, making a direct representa-
tion to the buyer which induces the buyer to purchase, and where the
seduced purchaser uses the product-properly of course-and is in-
jured by reason of a deleterious substance in the product, he should
and will be permitted recovery from that manufacturer because of
what the manufacturer did despite the lack of privity between the
parties. The reason for the rule of Rogers does not exist in implied
warranty. The defendant manufacturer did or has done nothing di-
rectly to or directed at the ultimate consumer who was injured. Real-
istically, the consumer who may be injured was not led by any implied
warranty to purchase.
BASIC THEORIES OF ACTION IN OHIO
A personal injury action or an action for property damage which
has as its factual foundation the use of, or exposure to, or contact with
a product may be founded on negligence, warranty, or fraud and deceit.
Although fraud and deceit is a perfectly good theory as expressed
by Judge Taft in his concurring opinion in Rogers, practically speak-
ing, it doesn't exist because it isn't needed. Moreover, because of its
connotation of malice, evil and crime, there is a consequent difficulty
of proof to a jury.
Negligence
The theory of a negligence action as applied to a products lia-
bility case in no way differs from negligence as applied in any other
personal injury case. It is the facts and the proof of facts which create
the problems. In food cases the breach of a statutory duty, namely,
the pure food and drug laws, makes proof of negligence easy.16
16 Yochem v. Gloria, Inc., 134 Ohio St. 427, 17 N.E.2d 731 (1938); Kniess v.
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Warranty
No attempt will be made here to tell you what an implied war-
ranty is because of limitations of space. Express warranty, however,
as defined in Rogers should be studied carefully. For plaintiff or de-
fendant the elements set forth by our supreme court should be crystal
clear, for plaintiff must not leave out a single element and defendant
must search for the one missing element.
There must be some representation by defendant directed to
plaintiff with respect to the quality or merit of defendant's product
which urges plaintiff to purchase the product from a retailer. Plaintiff
must have relied upon that representation in making the purchase.
Plaintiff must use the product reasonably and properly, and in many
cases in accordance with the directions. Plaintiff must be injured as
a result of a deleterious ingredient in the product or as a result of a
defect in the product.
It might here be asked, what is the difference between a case
founded on negligence and a case founded on warranty? Setting aside
the requirement of proof as to the express warranty itself, negligence
and warranty would still seem to require proof in each situation of
either a deleterious substance in the product or a defect, and the
element of proximate cause. Under Rogers the proof would seem
complete. In theory at least, in a negligence action one must go further
and show whether defendant as a reasonable person knew or should
have recognized the danger and should thus have taken precautions
to avoid the danger, and that the defect was caused by defendant's
failure to exercise reasonable care. As set out by our court in Sicard
v. Kremer:
Where the product is manufactured and sold with the knowledge
that it will come into contact with the user or operator, the manu-
facturer or distributor has not only the obligation that the product
will be according to contract, express or implied, but the added
common-law duty of not placing or having anything in the product
that will injure the buyer when used as intended. An action for the
violation of the former sounds in contract; an action for the latter
is in tort, yet both may be joined in the same complaint.17
Problems
In the breakdown of problems related to negligence and to war-
ranty, more time will be devoted to warranty than negligence. The
Armour & Co., supra note 11; Leonardo v. Haberman, 143 Ohio St. 623, 56 N.E.2d 232
(1944); Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960). Examples of cases
based upon negligence where the breach of duty is not established by the violation of a
statute are Witherspoon v. Haft, 157 Ohio St. 474, 106 N.E.2d 296 (1952), and Thrash
v. U-Drive-It Co., 158 Ohio St. 465, 110 N.E.2d 419 (1953).
17 Sicard v. Kremer, supra note 7, at 298, 13 N.E.2d at 253.
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reason is that most practitioners are familiar with negligence and its
problems, both from plaintiff's and defendant's point of view. This is
not necessarily true of warranty. Illustrative of a problem in a negli-
gence action is a break in the chain of causal connection between the
negligence of defendant sued and the injury of plaintiff by an inter-
vening act of negligence on the part of someone other than defendant.
In Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co.,"' plaintiff sued his immediate seller and
the remote seller for injuries resulting from an accident caused by a
defect in an automobile. The Ohio court held the immediate seller
liable but let out the remote seller, holding that the immediate seller
was responsible for his failure to find the defect in the automobile
when it was sold to him by the remote seller since he was a dealer in
automobiles, but the second or remote defendant was permitted to
escape liability as a matter of law because any negligence of his was
superseded and interrupted by the intervening act of negligence on the
part of the first defendant.
For illustrative purposes, Krysiak v. Acme Wire Co.19 is cited.
The facts in this case indicated that an insulated wire manufactured
by defendant was sold to plaintiff's employer for use in the employer's
manufacturing process. In that manufacturing process considerable
heat was applied to the product and this caused gaseous odors and
vapors to be released which injured plaintiff while he was working.
Having recovered under workmen's compensation from his employer
and limited as to defendants by that act, plaintiff pursued his remedy
against the manufacturer. As a matter of law, defendant was excused
from any responsibility toward plaintiff for two stated reasons. First,
the court held that plaintiff had failed to prove that the manufacturer
had knowledge of the use to which the product would be put and that
the defendant manufacturer need not anticipate the use to which the
product had been put. Second and I think more important, the court
held as a matter of law that defendant manufacturer need not antici-
pate that plaintiff's employer would be guilty of intervening negli-
gence-in this particular case, in violating Revised Code section
4101.02 requiring the employer to provide plaintiff with a safe place
in which to work. The court stated that defendant manufacturer did not
have to foresee that the employer would violate this statutory require-
ment.
A problem in products liability cases common to negligence and
warranty is proximate cause. Proximate cause is today supplied more
often than not in products liability cases by experts. Technically this
may not be a correct statement. The facts must still be proved by
18 Supra note 16.
19 169 F. Supp. 576 (ND. Ohio 1959).
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evidence. However, the expert not only tells the jury but seems to
tell the court that there is a causal relationship between facts sug-
gested or proven by evidence about the accident and the injury sus-
tained.
A scientific job of proof without scientists is illustrated by A. &
P. Tea Co. v. Hughes.2 0 This was a food case involving a charge of
negligence in selling poisoned or putrified pork sausage alleged to be
unfit for human food and injurious to the life and health of the person
eating it. The proof with respect to cause and deleteriousness of the
product was sustained by evidence that plaintiff had purchased the
product and, within a very short period of time, thoroughly fried the
pork in patties. Plaintiff ate the product and thereafter became quite
ill. Plaintiff developed his own experimental control group. He showed
that for several meals previous to the ingestion of defendant's pork,
plaintiff and other members of his family had eaten the same foods
but that no member of this control group had eaten any of defendant's
sausage. Strangely enough, no one besides plaintiff became ill. The
doctor diagnosed food poisoning. This case is often cited by counsel
for claimants for the law of the syllabus which shows that unwhole-
someness in a food case need not be proven by chemical or bacterio-
logical analysis or examination. The reasoning of the court is rather
interesting:
That sausage caused such illness in one whom the evidence tends
to show was in a natural and normal condition, with presumably
natural and normal functions of the body, in the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary, is surely some proof that the sausage was
unwholesome and deleterious to health.2 '
For the defense it can be seen from this case that it is important
to produce some evidence concerning the prior physical condition of
plaintiff, his exposure to other foods or to other possible causes of ill-
ness to which the control group, i.e., plaintiff's family, was not exposed.
Another problem in proximate cause facing plaintiff is the danger
of the application of the rule expressed in the syllabus in Gedra v.
Dallmer Co.:
In such an action, if the cause of an injury to a plaintiff may be as
reasonably attributed to an act for which the defendant is not liable
as to one for which he is liable, the plaintiff has not sustained the
burden of showing that his injury is a proximate result of the negli-
gence of the defendant. 22
20 131 Ohio St. 501, 3 N.E.2d 415 (1936).
21 Id. at 505, 3 N.E.2d at 416-7.
22 153 Ohio St. 258, 91 N.E.2d 256 (1950).
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In Janko v. Schneiderman and Roux Distributing Co.,23 plaintiff
testified that she had bought a product called Roux Color Shampoo
at a drug store. At the same time she had purchased some 20-volume
hydrogen peroxide which the instructions in the Roux pamphlet called
for and which must be mixed in equal proportions with the Roux Color
Shampoo. Plaintiff testified that she mixed the Roux Color Shampoo
with an equal amount of 20-volume hydrogen peroxide, applied it to
her head and developed dermatitis shortly thereafter. At the time
plaintiff was deposed prior to trial, she testified that she did not know
what brand of 20-volume hydrogen peroxide she had used and that
she had the hydrogen peroxide bottle at home. Upon trial, plaintiff
testified substantially as indicated above except that on direct examina-
tion she omitted any reference to the kind of hydrogen peroxide she
had used or the fact that she had the bottle in her possession. On cross-
examination counsel for defendant gained the admission from plaintiff
that she did not know what kind of hydrogen peroxide she had used
and that she did not have the bottle. Plaintiff had already testified
on direct that she had mixed the hydrogen peroxide with the Roux
Color Shampoo in an equally proportioned mixture and applied this
to her head.
The dermatologist who testified for plaintiff on direct testified
that the substance applied to plaintiff's head was the cause of the
dermatitis which she found thereafter. On cross-examination the
doctor was asked the following question:
Q. If Mrs. Janko did in fact apply Roux, this product, in equal
proportion and mixture with hydrogen peroxide of unknown
description and not here present, and thereafter she got the
same symptoms which you saw and examined, can you with
reasonable medical certainty tell which caused the dermatitis?
A. No.
The trial court directed a verdict on the reasoning of Gedra.
The court of appeals affirmed on this and other grounds but rendered
no opinion except a short journal entry published only in The Legal
News.
Warranty actions pose more specialized problems. What is an
affirmation of fact to fulfill the requirements of a warranty as dis-
tinguished from puffing? Each case must be decided on its own facts.
No rules can be clearly delineated. In Missouri, "kind to the hands"
has been held to be an express warranty where the plaintiff claimed she
suffered injury to her hands while using the product,24 but in Ohio a
23 Unreported, Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County, 1959, motion to certify over-
ruled; appeal dismissed 170 Ohio St. 48, 162 N.E.2d 124 (1959).
24 Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 244 Mo. App. 1057, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952).
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plaintiff claimed to rely on a statement on the package that Cheer was
"kind to your hands" when she washed her hair, and the court would
not allow the case to be submitted to the jury on warranty2 5
In Kennedy, 6 plaintiff testified that she purchased the product,
Lilly Dache's Color Safe, because it was more expensive than the
product she went to buy in the first place. It should be noted also that
plaintiff testified that she bought the product because she had once
purchased a Lilly Dache hat. The purpose of these illustrations is to
show that meticulous questioning as to all circumstances surrounding
the procurement and use of the product must be undertaken by defense
counsel in his cross-examination, and counsel for plaintiff must, in
discussing the case with his client, explore all the requirements of his
case in detail.
Under the Sales Act, the Uniform Commercial Code, and such
opinions as Thrash,27 plaintiff may find he has no warranty action since
the product was sold to him on an "as is" basis.
There may be no purchase or sale to support either implied
warranty or express warranty under the Rogers theory if the product
involved was a gift to the plaintiff. This raises such questions as
occurred in Carone v. Procter & Gamble2 as to whether or not a
free-sample distribution could create a warranty.
With respect to distributors who do not handle, except as a
conduit, the products involved, does the "original package" doctrine
as suggested in McMurray v. Vaughn Seeds, 9 Wolf v. A. & P. Co.,30
Outz v. Maloney,3' and the Rogers case apply? After all, if the reason
for placing the responsibility on the manufacturers in Rogers was
the fact that the retailers were mere conduits, then should not the
retailers be given the benefit of the "original package" doctrine?
Finally, in an action based upon warranty, either express or
implied, buyer or purchaser must give notice to the seller of the breach
of any promise or warranty within a reasonable time or any action in
warranty fails. This is an affirmative requirement on the part of the
plaintiff and should be pleaded. 2 Failure on the part of plaintiff to give
this notice within six months may preclude recovery as a matter of
law. 33
25 Carone v. Procter & Gamble Co., Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals unreported;
motion to certify overruled.
26 Kennedy v. General Beauty Products, supra note 15.
27 Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co., supra note 16.
28 Supra note 25.
29 117 Ohio St. 236, 157 N.E. 567 (1927).
30 143 Ohio St. 643, 56 N.E.2d 230 (1944).
31 157 Ohio St. 537, 106 N.E.2d 561 (1952).
32 McMurray v. Vaughn Seeds, supra note 29.
33 Columbia Axle v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 63 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1923).
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There is no recent Ohio decision on this notice question. From
personal experience I can say that it has been raised at an appellate
level in at least five cases in the last five years, but in each case the
reviewing court has decided the case in favor of the defendant who
raised the defense but on some issue other than notice and no comment
was made. Other jurisdictions, however, have tended to support this
defense and it is embodied in the Uniform Commercial Code, as
adopted in Ohio Revised Code section 1302.65.
In the comments of the American Law Institute on this section
in the draft of the Uniform Commercial Code it is suggested that the
time for notification would be controlled by commercial standards
with respect to a merchant buyer but that some undefined, different
standard is to be applied to the consumer. The element of good faith
is injected into this rule and an intent not to deprive a good-faith
consumer of his remedy is expressed.
An additional problem involved in products liability cases which
must be considered is that of obtaining jurisdiction over the proper
party. Because of the nature of national distribution of products by
large manufacturers, it is not always easy to obtain jurisdiction in
the forum of the plaintiff. Even if it is possible, it may be possible
only after considerable research and investigation on the part of
counsel to determine that the defendant is doing business within the
state and is subject to service. Many corporations will still litigate first
the question of jurisdiction and whether they are doing business in
the state. Their purpose may not be just to avoid jurisdiction in your
particular case but this may involve corporate problems, especially
taxation.
Another problem is the proper identification of the defendant.
The package does not always carry the name of the manufacturer. It
may indicate a particular corporation as the distributor only. The
plaintiff in Rogers sued "Toni Home Permanent Co." This was the
name of an actual corporation but it was neither the manufacturer nor
the distributor. It was never determined whether this was a good
defense inasmuch as the case was settled.
Further, in our state court it is not always possible to join the
retailer and the distributor or the manufacturer.3 4 A recent decision of
the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County35 seems to suggest that a
retailer and a manufacturer may be joined in the same cause. The
opinion is not enlightening as to the actual allegations in the petition.
34 This is based upon Kniess v. Armour & Co., supra note 11, and Canton Provision
Co. v. Gauder, 130 Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E. 634 (1935).
35 Huggins v. John Monell & Co., 89 Ohio L. Abs. 607, 184 N.E.2d 230 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1962).
1963]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The opinion does not cite any Ohio Supreme Court decision on the
question of joinder of defendants primarily and secondarily liable. It
does cite cases which refer to the proper joinder of defendants who
are charged with joint and concurrent acts of negligence. In short,
a plaintiff may be able to plead in such a way as to withstand a
demurrer against misjoinder of the retailer and the manufacturer, but
his problems of proof will be something else againysA
COMMENTS ON UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Chapter 13 of the Ohio Revised Code became effective July 1,
1962, replacing the Sales Act and generally adopting the Uniform
Commercial Code. This is not an attempt to explain the Uniform Com-
mercial Code but rather to point out some sections of the Code ap-
plicable to products liability cases. Section 1302.26 defines in detail
what an express warranty is and how it is created. Revised Code section
1302.27 defines an implied warranty of merchantability. Revised Code
section 1302.28 defines the implied warranty of fitness.
Revised Code section 1302.29 makes it clear that all warranties
may be avoided if the proper steps are taken on the part of the seller.
It specifically includes the words which may be used to exclude any
warranty. These include "as is." This confirms the Ohio case law.
Revised Code section 1302.31 eliminates the requirement of
privity in an action based upon express or implied warranty in certain
limited areas. It is entitled "Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties,
Express or Implied." It reflects the reasoning and the principles ex-
pressed as far back as Ward and White as well as Rogers. However,
one must read this section carefully. It is not a panacea for plaintiffs'
ills. It reads as follows:
A seller's warranty, whether express or implied extends to any
natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or
who is the guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such
person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in his person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Frankly, this section appears to have a great potential for litigation.
Privity is eliminated in an action in express or implied warranty but
only in an action for personal injury. The elimination of privity extends
only to a natural person, so your dog may die from dog food but there
is no action in warranty against the manufacturer. It extends only to
a natural person who is in the household or in the family of the buyer.
Your children, if you are the purchaser, are covered and your wife
35A See Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.191 which changed the rule on joinder of parties
defendant to coincide with rule 20 F.R.C.P. effective 8-26-63.
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is covered and perhaps even your mother-in-law is covered. Is your
cleaning woman who works one day a week and has lunch in your home
covered? Are the delivery man, the mailman, or the door-to-door
salesman included? If you can squeeze the injured person within the
group, then you must meet the further test, "Is it reasonable to
expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods?"
In short, this section does not appear to affect Wood or Rogers. It
would not seem to produce a different result in Kennedy on its facts,
since Mrs. Kennedy was not General Beauty Products' buyer or in
the prescribed relationship to General Beauty Products' buyer, the
retailer.
I don't believe that we can say that there has been an elimination of
the requirement of privity in an action by the donee of a gift. If one
buys a toy for one's daughter to give to her little school chum at a
birthday party as a birthday present, the donee has no action in
express or implied warranty against the manufacturer. Beware of
your Christmas presents!
Revised Code section 1302.59 is an interesting section which
gives a defendant the statutory right to obtain the evidence with
respect to goods involved for testing. This codifies the rule set down in
Driver v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,"6 where a petition for discovery was
used to obtain the claimed defective cosmetic for examination by the
defendant.
In conclusion, it should be remembered that you are dealing
primarily with a personal injury or property damage case which by its
nature more often than not requires considerable effort on the part of
the attorney to prove his case. From a practical standpoint, the vast
majority of products liability cases involve little injury. In most cases
the upset stomach has no permanency. The dermatitis goes away when
the irritating agent is withdrawn. The cut or burn heals without
permanent injury, disfigurement or disability. We know of the
exceptions to this statement, but in fairness to clients it would seem
reasonable to properly evaluate the injury first in a case which comes
into one's office before undertaking an action.
What sets a "products liability case" apart from any other
personal injury and property damage claim or cause is the amount of
effort counsel must expend to prepare the case, and the degree to which
the attorney must himself become an expert in fields outside of the law.
36 58 Ohio App. 299, 16 N.E.2d 548 (1938).
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